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SALE OF MERCHANDISE IN THE MARKETPLACE OF
IDEAS: TITAN WRESTLERS CHALLENGE
POSTERS WITHIN MAGAZINE
I. INTRODUCTION
In one comer stands the current challenger to freedom of the press,
"The Titan Wrestlers!"' The Titan Wrestlers2 will attempt to establish
that publication of posters of professional wrestlers within a magazine,
without consent, violates their right to control the commercial exploita-
tion of their own names and likenesses. In the other comer, our current
defender of freedom of the press, "Comics World."' Comics World will
attempt to establish that first amendment protection for freedom of the
press protects the media's right to publish "magazine posters"4 which
depict the Titan Wrestlers without their consent. Hold on to your seats,
for the victory of either opponent could give new meaning to the "mar-
ketplace of ideas."'
Under first amendment doctrine, the metaphor of the "marketplace
1. Titan Sports, Inc., is a Massachusetts corporation, with its principal place of business
in Connecticut, which owns the right to exploit the names and likenesses of the "Titan Wres-
tlers" who include such professional wrestlers as: Hulk Hogan, Lou Albano, King Kong
Bundy, Brutus Beefcake, Junkyard Dog, Tony Atlas, "Superstar" Billy Graham, Ivan Putsky,
Chief Jay Strongbow, Bruno Sammartino, Ricky Steamboat, Jesse Ventura, Paul Orndorff,
Greg Valentine, Billy Jack Haynes, Jimmy Snuka, The British Bulldogs, Rick Martel and
Hillybilly Jim. Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) rev'd, 870 F.2d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 1989).
2. The Titan Wrestlers perform worldwide under the auspices of the World Wrestling
Federation ("WWF"). Id. at 1317.
3. The defendants-appellees in Titan are Comics World Corporation (U.S.A.), Comics
World, Inc., Starlog Group, Inc., O'Quinn Studios, Inc., corporations organized under the
laws of the State of New York with their principal places of business in New York, Kerry
O'Quinn and Norman Jacobs, officers and directors of Comics World Corp. and Starlog
Group, Inc., and are both citizens and residents of New York (collectively "Comics World").
Defendants publish magazines such as "Wrestling Poster Magazine," "Wrestling All Stars,"
"Wrestling All Stars Super Giant Pin-Ups," "Superstar Wrestler Photo Album" and "Wres-
tling Scene," or published such magazines in the past. Id.
4. The court described defendants' product to include "[ljarge, folded photographic in-
serts variously known as 'magazine posters,' pin-ups, pullouts, centerfolds, or fold-outs, which
are affixed by staples or otherwise to the inside of normal magazines, and often cannot be
completely viewed without removing them entirely from the magazine. When pulled out and
unfolded, defendants' inserts are approximately 16" x 22", or four-times the surface area of a
normal 8" x 11" magazine page." Id.
5. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting). See
also M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1-12 (1984); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 387-89 (1967).
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of ideas"6 supports the constitutional guarantee of a free press. This con-
cept embodies an idea that the "test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . ."' In other
words, truth can only emerge through the free dissemination of ideas and
newsworthy matter within the public discourse. The underlying ration-
ale is that through the free dissemination of ideas, our political system
and a free society can be maintained.8 The significance of this rationale
allows the media to exploit the dissemination of news and information
through traditional communications media, like magazines, within the
public domain.
A public figure,9 whether such person is an athlete, an entertainer or
a well-known celebrity, exploits a different kind of market - a commer-
cial market. In the course of a public career, a very valuable proprietary
interest in a face or likeness will result.' 0 A public figure may invest
years of practice and creative efforts in cultivating a marketable status."
This marketable status has been analogized to a commercial entity's right
to profit from the "goodwill" it has built up in its name. 2 Thus, tradi-
tionally, celebrities have found a very lucrative market in manufacturing
and distributing merchandise such as T-shirts, 3 sweatshirts,' 4 trading
cards,' 5 and posters.' 
6
The very nature and character of a public figure will promote a pub-
6. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
7. Id.
8. See supra note 5.
9. A category of persons who have "general fame and notoriety in the community, and
are public figures for all purposes." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 12-13 at 873-82 (2d Ed. 1988).
10. See Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New
York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Grant v. Esquire, Inc.,
367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
11. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 790, 340
N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
12. Grant, 367 F. Supp. at 879.
13. See Rosemont Enterprises v. Choppy Productions, Inc., 74 Misc. 2d 1003, 347
N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
14. Id.
15. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
16. See Brinkley, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004; Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Loftus v. Greenwich
Lithographing Co., 182 N.Y.S. 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 1920); Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
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lic interest. 7 Therefore, the activities of a public figure will always con-
stitute news. 18 However, "[w]hile one who is a public figure or is
presently newsworthy may be the proper subject of news or informative
presentation, the privilege [of disseminating newsworthy matter] does
not extend to commercialization of his personality through a form of
treatment distinct from the dissemination of news or information."' 9
In the balance of what constitutes the legitimate public interest, the
right of privacy affords a public figure, often the subject of public interest,
very little protection. 20  The right of publicity, in contrast, "is closely
analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right
of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and having little to
do with protecting feelings or reputation."
2'
In New York, early case law refused to recognize that private figures
had the right to control the use of their name or likeness under a right to
privacy.22 The courts soon recognized, however, that the complaining
parties were upset not at the usage of their name or likeness, but because
they were denied a share in the economic profits derived from the us-
age.23 The loss of profits became more evident when the complaining
party was a well-known celebrity.24 Consequently, the right of publicity
comes into play when the plaintiff has "achieved in some degree a cele-
17. Paulsen, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507, 59 Misc. 2d at 449.
18. Id.
19. Titan, 870 F.2d at 88 (quoting Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 359, 107
N.E.2d 485 (1952)).
20. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
21. Brinkley, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1010 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). See also Pamela Samuelson, Revising Zacchini: Analyzing First
Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1983)
("The right of publicity - the right of a person to control and benefit from the commercial
value of his name, likeness, performance style, and the like - is a newly emerging basis for
tort actions.").
22. The right of privacy protects a " 'person's right to be let alone,' with recovery being
grounded on the mental strain, distress, humiliation and disturbance of the peace of mind
suffered by such person .. " Paulsen, 59 Misc. 2d at 450, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 508. See also
Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868 ("[a] personal and non-assignable right not to have
[your] feelings hurt .... ).
23. See Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 361, 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (1952) (J.
Desmond, concurring); accord Paulsen, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 508, 59 Misc. 2d at 450 ("Privacy in
its usual sense is hardly the goal of an entertainer or performer. What such a figure really
seeks is a type of relief which will enable him to garner financial benefits from the pecuniary
value which attaches to his name and picture.").
24. See, e.g., Brinkley, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (fashion model Christie Brink-
ley); Grant, 367 F. Supp. 876 (actor Cary Grant); Ali, 447 F. Supp. 723 (heavyweight cham-
pion Muhammad Ali).
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brated status." 25
The right of publicity protects "[t]he pecuniary value which at-
taches to the names and pictures of public figures, particularly athletes
and entertainers, and the right of such people to this financial benefit." 26
Thus, the right of publicity acknowledges that a commercial market ex-
ists for public figures to commercially exploit his or her name or face,
"[a]nd such market - like any other - must have its recognized rules
and experts."27
This article argues that the first amendment does not protect an in-
fringement on the right of publicity. The attempt to sell an item of mer-
chandise within the confines of a magazine does not promote the free
dissemination of ideas. While the protections afforded to the media
under the first amendment are very significant, courts must recognize a
limit on that right when the media seeks to enter a market in which it
does not belong.
II. TITAN SPORTS, INC. V. COMICS WORLD CORP.
A. Background of Case
Titan owns the rights in the names and likenesses of professional
wrestlers such as Hulk Hogan, Randy "Macho Man" Savage, Lou Al-
bano, among others.2" The fame and notoriety of these wrestlers ema-
nates from the national popularity of professional wrestling. The novelty
of this sport is referred to as "Wrestlemania. "29
The wrestling matches and other services for Titan are performed
under the sponsorship of the World Wrestling Federation ("WWF").
The "WWF wrestlers" make appearances throughout the United States
and Canada. Their performances can be seen on regularly scheduled tel-
evision broadcasting and cable television programs produced by Titan. °
Moreover, Titan continues to conduct sales and licensing of various
products featuring the names and likenesses of the wrestlers, including
posters. The parties have stipulated that the wrestlers are in fact "public
figures.""'
25. See Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
26. See Rosemont Enter., v. Random, 58 Misc. 2d at 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
27. See Grant, 367 F. Supp. at 881.
28. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
29. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1317.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Comics World,32 on the other hand, publishes such magazines as
"Wrestling Poster Magazine," "Wrestling All Stars," "Wrestling All
Stars Super Giant Pin-ups, .... Superstar Wrestlers Photo Album" and
"Wrestling Scene."33 Many of these magazines include 16" x 22" photo-
graphs or "magazine posters" of Titan's wrestlers.34 Comics World folds
the posters into 8" x 11" squares and staples them into the magazine. 35
Comics World also uses these photographs and the wrestlers' names in
subsequent features of their magazine to solicit subscriptions or for the
purchase of back issues of the magazine. 36 This practice occurs without
Titan's consent.
B. Statement of Facts
Titan brought suit in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York.37  Titan alleged that the oversized photo-
graphs violate Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law.38 This
section prohibits the use of names and likenesses in any and all media
"for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade" without written
consent.39 In order to prevail under this section, a plaintiff must estab-
lish three elements: (1) that the defendant used plaintiff's name, portrait
or picture within the state, (2) that such use was for purposes of advertis-
ing or trade, and (3) the use occurred without first obtaining plaintiff's
written consent. 4° Comics World conceded that the names and pictures
of Titan's wrestlers were used within New York and without first ob-
taining Titan's written consent. As a result, the dispositive issues in the
lower court were whether the magazine posters were used for purposes of
32. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
33. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1317.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1315.
38. Titan filed suit against Comics World in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York based on diversity. Titan, 690 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
39. N.Y. Cv. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1988) states in pertinent part:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising
purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained as
above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state
against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to
prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any
injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have knowingly
used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is forbidden or de-
clared to be unlawful by section fifty of this article, the jury, in its discretion, may
award exemplary damages.
40. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1319.
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advertising or trade.41
Comics World argued that folding and stapling the posters into their
magazine does not violate Section 51 because the inserts are part of the
magazine which depicts newsworthy subjects and thus are protected
under the first amendment.42 Comics World also claimed that a corre-
sponding news article appears in every issue of their "poster
magazines,, 43 further precluding an advertising or trade purpose under
the statute.
Both Titan and Comics World filed motions for summary judgment
on the grounds that there was no material issue of genuine fact and thus
each was entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
The district court found that Comics World's product was a "bona
fide newsstand publication."45 The court held that because the photos
bear a direct relationship to the newsworthy topic of the magazine which
in turn bears a direct relation to articles and news information contained
in the magazine, the use of the oversized photos are protected by the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.' The court further stated
that "the constitutional protection of the freedom of the press does not
stop at 8" x 11 ".". Accordingly, the court granted Comics World's mo-
tion for summary judgment and dismissed Titan's complaint with
prejudice.48
On appeal, the Second Circuit,49 however, disagreed. Titan did not
contest that Comics World's use of the magazine posters was not for
advertising purposes.50 Titan's appeal thus proceeded on the narrower
issue of whether the alleged improper usage was for "purposes of
trade."5
Under New York case law, the media is immunized from the reach
of Section 51 if the article illustrates a "newsworthy" item regarding a
matter of public interest that is not merely incidental to a commercial
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1318.
43. Id.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
45. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1319.
46. Id. at 1323.
47. Id. at 1322.
48. Id. at 1323.
49. Titan filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989).
50. Titan, 870 F.2d at 87.
51. Id.
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purpose.5 2 Since the wrestlers are public figures, the court of appeals
held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the over-
sized photographs were used for "purposes of trade" and, therefore, not
entitled to first amendment protection." The court reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Comics World and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.54
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. District Court's Analysis
The principal issue before the district court was the extent of the
coverage of Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law as it related to
the publication of the magazine posters depicting the professional wres-
tlers without their prior consent.55 Since both parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment, resolution of the issue required that the court
review the substantive law to ascertain the material facts.56 The court
would then decide whether a material issue existed as to a material fact.5 7
1. Bona Fide Newsstand Publications
The court found that the defendant's magazines, with or without the
photographic inserts, are bona fide newsstand publications.58 It stated
that the magazines in question, including all the articles and photo-
graphs, are devoted solely to the sport of professional wrestling.59 In
addition, the magazines containing the inserts are manufactured and dis-
tributed in the same manner as most magazines in the industry intended
for newsstand sale.60
2. Newsworthiness of Wrestlers
The court found that New York state and federal courts have inter-
preted Section 51 to exempt publications in magazines that are "news-
worthy" and matters of public interest.6 ' Under Stephano v. Newsgroup
52. Davis v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 90 A.D.2d 374, 379-80, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313
(1982).
53. Titan, 870 F.2d at 89.
54. Id.
55. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1316.
56. Id. at 1318.
57. Id. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
58. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1319.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1319.
1990]
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Publications, Inc.,62 the New York Court of Appeals stated that this ex-
ception reflects federal and state constitutional concerns for free dissemi-
nation of news and other matters of public interest.63
In applying this newsworthiness exemption to the WWF wrestlers,
the court noted how the sport of wrestling and the WWF wrestlers have
become significantly newsworthy in recent years.' 4 Based on the regular-
ity of the wrestlers' national performances and the fact that they are sub-
jects of regularly published magazines, regularly scheduled broadcasts
and television programs, the court found that the wrestlers are truly pub-
lic personalities of both sports and entertainment. 65 Based on these find-
ings and the parties' stipulation that the wrestlers are public figures, the
court concluded that the WWF wrestlers are proper subjects of news-
stand publications.66
3. Application of Section 51
As noted above, to establish a violation under Section 51, the plain-
tiff must show that "(1) the defendant used plaintiff's name, portrait or
picture within the state, (2) for purposes of advertising or trade, and (3)
without first obtaining plaintiff's consent."' 67 The court initially found
that Titan had established "use" within the state. 68 The parties also stip-
ulated that the defendants used the photos without the consent, written
or otherwise, of the wrestlers or Titan.69 Thus, there were no genuine or
material issues of fact with regard to the first and third prong of Section
51.
a. Advertising Purposes
Titan argued that defendants violated the advertising prong of Sec-
tion 51 by using the pictures, portraits and names of the wrestlers in their
advertisements for soliciting the purchase of back issues of defendants'
"poster magazines" by reference to the large photo inserts included in
them.7° The court, however, stated that in order to constitute use for
advertising purposes, "the use must appear in or as part of an advertise-
62. 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580 (1984).
63. Id.
64. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1317.
65. Id. at 1320.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1319. See also supra note 39 and accompanying statutory text.
68. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1318.
69. Id. at 1317.
70. Id. at 1320.
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ment or solicitation for patronage."''" If the advertisement is merely inci-
dental to a privileged use there is no violation of Section 5 1.72
The court found that the advertising prong of Section 51 would not
be violated where the use was not designed primarily to solicit purchasers
for defendants' products. 73 The court reasoned that since the original
publication of the magazines involved dissemination of matters of public
interest, and thus not originally used for "advertising purposes," later
solicitations for subscriptions or the sale of back issues, would also not
constitute an improper use for advertising purposes. 74 The court did not
find any significance in defendants' use of the names of the wrestlers,
whose pictures had appeared in past issues containing the large photo
inserts, to solicit subscriptions of their magazines.75 The court, therefore,
concluded that use of the photos in advertisements to solicit the purchase
of back issues constituted a republication of samples of the newsworthy
content of defendant's magazines, and was thus protected.76
b. Trade Purposes
The court cited the Second Circuit's interpretation of what consti-
tutes purposes of trade under prong two of Section 5 1.7 7 Under Lerman
v. Flynt Publishing Co.i7 ("Lerman"), when the unconsented use of
plaintiff's photo is in conjunction with a matter of public interest, to pre-
vail, the plaintiff must satisfy any one of the following: (1) that use of
plaintiff's name or likeness has no relation to the discussion, and is thus
an advertisement in disguise, or (2) that defendant's use was infected
with material and substantial fiction or falsity thus forfeiting the privilege
for reporting public interest matters.79 The court stated that the second
alternative did not apply because there was nothing to suggest that
Comics World's use was anything other than a bona fide photographic
representation of the WWF wrestlers.80
As to the first alternative, the court found that defendants'
71. Id. at 1320 (citing Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., 745 F.2d 123, 130 (2d Cir.
1984)).
72. Id.
73. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1320 (citing Herink v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 607 F.
Supp. 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
74. Id. at 1321 (citing Velez v. VV Publishing Corp., 135 A.D.2d 47, 524 N.Y.S.2d 186
(1988)).
75. Id. at 1321.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 496 F. Supp. 1104.
79. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1321.
80. Id.
1990]
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magazines are entirely devoted to professional wrestling.8" In addition,
each issue contains news about wrestling, excerpts from interviews with
the wrestlers, and a full-page report about each of the wrestlers featured
in the large photographic insert section.82 The court therefore found that
the location of the inserts in the center of the magazine, stapled to pre-
clude full viewing without removal, does not alter the fact that the photo-
graphs correspond to dissemination of matters of public interest.83
The court stated that magazines regularly divide up articles in the
front and back of magazines in order to force the reader's attention to
latter portions of the magazines and the advertisements therein.84 The
court said that this method merely makes the enjoyment of newsworthy
matters a little more difficult. 85 As a result, the court found plaintiff's
argument that placement of the photos separate from a news article
caused the photos not to correspond to the topic of the magazine without
merit.86
4. Posters Not Protected Under Section 51
Titan argued that the photo inserts are posters and therefore should
not be afforded exemption from the coverage of Section 51. 87 Titan re-
lied on two cases where the first amendment freedom of the press did not
apply to posters of entertainment figures. In Brinkley v. Casablancas
88
("Brinkley"), model Christie Brinkley prevailed under Section 51 to pre-
vent the unconsented publication of posters made from an unapproved
shot at a prior photo session.89 Also, in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc. ' ("Factors"), the owners of Elvis Presley's right of publication pre-
vailed in enjoining the unconsented publication of a poster which de-
picted the singer and the words, "In Memory," three days after Elvis'
death.9" However, the court found that both Brinkley and Factors were
distinguishable on their facts.92
The court first noted that in both Brinkley and Factors the posters
were printed on high quality paper and constituted a type suitable for
81. Id. at 1319.
82. Id. at 1321.
83. Id.
84. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1322.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004.
89. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1322.
90. 579 F.2d 215 (1978).
91. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1322.
92. Id.
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framing.93 Secondly, defendants were not engaged in the sale of
magazines containing large pull-outs and photo inserts that could double
as wallhangings for some readers.94 The court also noted that the de-
fendants in Brinkley did not contest the fact that the picture of Ms.
Brinkley was used for trade purposes under Section 51.9- Consequently,
the court reasoned that these factual differences indicated that the first
amendment freedom of the press was not really at issue in Brinkley and
Factors. 96
The court then discussed the purchasers' desires to remove photo-
graphs from the magazines and pin them up on walls. It felt that the
"poster magazines" were merely following this industry trend in re-
sponse to reader demand. 97
Finally, the court found that since magazines come in all shapes and
sizes, defendants could easily publish a magazine that is 16" x 22" or
larger.9 8 The court stated that "[c]onstitutional protection of the free-
dom of the press does not stop at 8" x 1 "."99
Thus, the court held that defendants' magazines used photos that
bear a direct relationship to the newsworthy topic of the magazines,
which bear a direct correspondence to the articles and news information
contained therein."I° Therefore, the use of the oversized photos are pro-
tected by the first amendment and the defendant's publication of the
wrestlers' photographs did not violate Section 51.101 Accordingly, the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied and defendants'
motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint was
granted with prejudice.'
°2
B. Appellate Court's Analysis
The United States Appellate Court for the Second Circuit disagreed,
and found that a genuine issue of material fact did exist as to whether the
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1322.
97. For example, the pin-up of Betty Grable during World War II, Marilyn Monroe dur-
ing the 1950's, and Playboy's fold-outs. Id. But cf Reply Brief for Appellant at 6, Titan
Sports, Inc. v. Comics World, 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1988) (No. 88-7734) ("[lIt is common
knowledge that the models for the centerfolds in magazines such as Playboy ... are not only
[consented] to but are extremely well paid for the use of their photographs ... .
98. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1322.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1323.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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oversized photographs of professional wrestlers, folded and stapled inside
defendants' magazines, constituted use for "purposes of trade," and thus
were not entitled to first amendment protection.10 3 Hence, the appellate
court reversed the district court's ruling.'0 4
1. Background of Section 51
The appellate court stated that Section 51 provides remedies for the
commercialization of an individual's personality without his consent. 15
The court also agreed that New York courts, recognizing first amend-
ment considerations, have held that "purposes of trade" do not apply to
"publications concerning newsworthy events or matters of public
interest."
06
In addition, the court acknowledged that an insignificant public in-
terest aspect of a "publication" cannot exempt it from the reach of Sec-
tion 51 where the primary aspect of the product is commercial.'o 7 Thus,
in determining usage for purposes of trade, the court must consider
whether the public interest aspect of the publication is merely incidental
to its commercial purpose.
0 8
In particular, the appellate court stated that New York courts have
recognized that presentation of an item within a publication generally
entitled to first amendment protection may constitute use for purposes of
trade. " Thus, a photograph accompanying an article concerning a mat-
ter of public interest may still be considered a use for purposes of trade if
"it has no real relationship to the article . . . or . . . the article is an
advertisement in disguise."''"o Also, in contrast to the treatment of news-
worthy items, the court held that photographs marketed as posters are
used for purposes of trade.'
Further, the court stated that the New York Court of Appeals" 2
has recognized that "[w]hile one who is a public figure or is presently
newsworthy may be the proper subject of news or informative presenta-
tion, the privilege does not extend to commercialization of his personality
103. Titan, 870 F.2d at 88-89.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 87 (citing Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 474
N.E.2d 580, 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (1984)).
106. Id.
107. Titan, 870 F.2d at 87.
108. Id. at 87-88 (citing Davis, 90 A.D.2d at 379-80, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 313).
109. Titan, 870 F.2d at 88.
110. Id. (citing Stephano, 64 N.Y.2d at 185, 474 N.E.2d at 585, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 225).
111. Id. at 88.
112. The New York Court of Appeals is the highest court in the state of New York.
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through a form of treatment distinct from the dissemination of news or
information."' 
1 3
The court also cited to Brinkley for the proposition that "[a] public
figure does not, however, surrender all right to privacy."11 4 Although his
privacy is necessarily limited by the newsworthiness of his activities, he
retains the "independent right to have [his] personality, even if news-
worthy, free from commercial exploitation at the hands of another." 5
The court felt that a determination that a product is a "bona fide
newsstand publication" does not resolve this controversy. '1 6 The court
said that there are items included within a bona fide newsstand publica-
tion that may have value for purposes of trade, despite an incidental
value for dissemination of news. 1 7 The court noted that just because the
item is physically attached within the covers of a magazine does not pro-
vide automatic exemption from the scope of "purposes of trade" or auto-
matic protection under the first amendment."1
8
In addition, the court stated that the first amendment does not pro-
tect "a subterfuge or cover for private or commercial exploitation."' 19
To illustrate, the court stated that Comics World could not staple a T-
shirt of a Titan Wrestler within the magazine covers and expect exemp-
tion from Section 51.120
In order for the trial court to decide whether large photos folded
and stapled into Comics World's magazines are distributed for purposes
of trade and thus not entitled to first amendment protection, the court
offered the following guidelines: (1) whether the photos are included pri-
marily for their "public interest aspect" or (2) whether the public interest
aspect "is merely incidental to [the distributors] commercial purpose. '121
In addition, it stated that courts should consider a variety of factors in-
cluding, but not limited to the following: (1) the nature of the item, (2)
the extent of its relationship to the traditional content of the magazine,
(3) the ease with which it may be detached from the magazine, (4)
whether it is suitable for use as a separate product once detached, and (5)
how the publisher markets the item. 122
113. Titan, 870 F.2d at 88 (citing Gautier, 304 N.Y. at 359, 107 N.E.2d at 488).
114. Titan, 870 F.2d at 88.
115. Id. at 88 (quoting Brinkley, 80 A.D.2d at 433, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1008).
116. Titan, 870 F.2d at 88.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 581 (1977)).
120. Titan, 870 F.2d at 88.
121. Id. at 88-89 (citing Davis, 90 A.D.2d at 379-80, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 313).
122. Id. at 89.
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In conclusion, the appellate court held that there remains a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Comics World's publications were
used for purposes of trade. '23 Accordingly, it reversed the district court's
grant of the defendant's summary judgment and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's decision.124
IV. PRIOR LEGISLATIVE AND CASE HISTORY
A. Sections 50 and 51 of Right to Privacy Statute
1. Background
Section 51 was enacted in New York in response to the controversial
1902 decision of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. ("Roberson")."15
In Roberson, the defendant distributed thousands of posters for a flour
advertisement which depicted plaintiff without her consent. 126 The court
of appeals defined plaintiff's claim as "the claim that a man has ... to
pass through this world, if he wills, without having his picture published
... or his eccentricities commented upon either in handbills, circulars,
catalogues, periodicals or newspapers .... ,,27 After an examination of
various authorities, the court concluded that the "so-called 'right of pri-
vacy' has not yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence." 128 In
response to the public outcry against the Roberson decision, the New
York legislature enacted Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law and
entitled it the "Right of Privacy."129
The purpose of Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights
Law 130 ("statute") is to prevent the commercial misappropriation of a
person's name or picture. 13' Section 50 provides criminal penalties for
use of a person's name, picture or likeness for advertising or trade pur-
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). See also Lerman, 745 F.2d at 129; Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 380 (1966); Brief for Appellant at 25, Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World,
870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1988) (No. 88-7734).
126. Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 542, 64 N.E. at 442.
127. Id. at 544, 64 N.E. at 443.
128. Id. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447.
129. Lerman, 745 F.2d 123 at 129. Prior to the Roberson decision in 1890, S. Warren and
L. Brandeis published an article entitled The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
This article discerned many abuses by the mass media that intruded upon a person's right to
privacy. As shown by the holding in Roberson, 13 years later, New York's highest court re-
fused to acknowledge a common law right to privacy. See also Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
45 N.Y.2d 493, 497 n.2, 382 N.E.2d 1145, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1978); Arrington v. The New
York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 440, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1982).
130. See supra note 39.
131. Davis, 90 A.D.2d at 381, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
[Vol. 10
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
poses without consent. 32 Section 51 affords equitable relief in the form
of an injunction against such use, and compensatory and exemplary
damages. 1
33
Sections 50 and 51 created a statutory right to privacy in New
York. 134 However, in light of the court's refusal in Roberson to acknowl-
edge a common law right to privacy, the legislature drafted the statute
very narrowly. 35 The application of the statute was considered limited
to the circumstances of Roberson, 136 that is, "only the commercial use of
a person's name or likeness without permission is prohibited."'1
37
2. Newsworthy Exception
The constitutional protections of freedom of the press and media,
however, required a careful delineation of the statute. 38 In order to give
proper recognition to these constitutional concerns, application of the
statute has been restricted "to avoid any conffict with the free dissemina-
tion of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public
interest."
39
In particular, the courts adopted a newsworthy exception to the stat-
ute. 14 The newsworthy exception essentially states that if the picture
illustrates an article on a matter of public interest the use is not consid-
ered a use for purposes of trade or advertising under the statute, unless
the picture does not have a real relationship to the article, or unless the
article is an advertisement in disguise.
14 1
The New York courts have freely defined the term "public inter-
132. See supra note 39.
133. See supra note 39.
134. Lerman, 745 F.2d at 129; Gautier, 304 N.Y. at 358, 107 N.E.2d at 487.
135. Arrington, 55 N.Y.2d at 439, 434 N.E.2d at 1321.
136. Id. ("Legislature confined its measured departure from existing case law to circum-
stances akin to those presented in Roberson. In no other respect did it undertake to roll back
the court-pronounced refusal to countenance an action for invasion of privacy.") See also
Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 381.
137. Davis, 90 A.D.2d at 378, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 312; Arrington, 55 N.Y.2d at 439, 434
N.E.2d at 1321.
138. Davis, 90 A.D.2d at 378, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
139. See Brinkley, 80 A.D.2d at 432, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1007. See also Gautier, 304 N.Y. at
359, 107 N.E.2d at 488 ("It has long been recognized that the use of name or picture in a
newspaper, magazine, or newsreel, in connection with an item of news or one that is news-
worthy, is not a use for purposes of trade within the meaning of the Civil Rights law.").
140. See generally, Paulsen, 59 Misc. 2d at 448, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 506 (citing Gautier, 304
N.Y. at 359, 107 N.E.2d at 488).
141. SeeArrington, 55 N.Y.2d at 440, 434 N.E.2d at 1322; Stephano, 64 N.Y.2d at 185, 485
N.Y.S.2d at 225 (quoting Murray v. New York Magazine Co., 27 N.Y.2d 406, 409, 267
N.E.2d 256, 258, 318 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (1971)).
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est."' 42 In Arrington v. New York Times143 ("Arrington"), plaintiff's
photograph was taken while he walked along a New York street.' 4
Without the plaintiff's consent, the picture was published in a magazine
of the New York Times illustrating an article regarding "the role of the
expanding black middle/professional class in today's society."' 45 De-
spite plaintiff's asserted disagreement with the views expressed by the
article regarding the black middle class, the court held that the article
related to a subject of public interest." This result immunized the pub-
lishers from the reach of Sections 50 and 51.147
However, the New York courts have recognized that "[p]resentation
of an item within a publication generally entitled to first amendment pro-
tection may constitute a use for purposes of trade, which is not entitled to
first amendment protection."' 48 To illustrate, the Second Circuit stated
that "Comics World could not staple a T-shirt bearing the likeness of a
Titan Wrestler between magazine covers and claim exemption from Sec-
tion 51 and first amendment protection for a 'wrestling T-shirt
magazine.' ,149
B. Right to Privacy v. Right to Publicity
Although Sections 50 and 51 are conjunctively entitled "Right to
Privacy," the statute encompasses both a right of privacy and the right of
publicity. In some cases the two concepts are blended together for recov-
ery under the statute. 150 However, the interests protected under each
right are entirely different.
In a conventional sense, the right to privacy involves a "person's
right to be let alone.' 5 ' Any recovery for this right is grounded on
"mental strain, distress, humiliation and disturbance of the peace of
mind .... '"" As stated in Grant v. Esquire 153 ("Grant"), the right to
privacy permits damages for "injured feelings and general embarrass-
142. Arrington, 55 N.Y.2d at 440, 434 N.E.2d at 1322.
143. 55 N.Y.2d 433, 434 N.E.2d 1319 (1982).
144. Id. at 433, 434 N.E.2d at 1320.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 440, 434 N.E.2d at 1322.
147. Id. at 443, 434 N.E.2d at 1323-24.
148. Titan, 870 F.2d at 88.
149. Id.
150. Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 723; Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 583,
380 N.Y.S.2d 839 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
151. See Paulsen, 59 Misc. 2d at 450, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 508; see also W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971).
152. Paulsen, 59 Misc. 2d at 450, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
153. 367 F. Supp. 876 (1973).
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ment if for purposes of trade he is unjustifiably subjected to the harsh and
- to him - unwelcome glare of publicity." '154 The right to privacy has
always been considered a purely personal right, enforceable only by the
party seeking redress for injuries under the statute. 55
However, the New York courts recognized that some parties' real
complaints under the statute were "[flar from having their feelings
bruised through public exposure of their likenesses."' 56 For instance, in
Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc.,17 ("Gautier") plaintiff, a well-known
trainer of animals, performed during halftime at a professional football
game.'58 Plaintiff alleged a violation of his right of privacy for the unau-
thorized telecasting of his performance.' 59 The court held that there was
no use for advertising or trade purposes under Section 51.1 " However,
the concurring judge in Gautier expressed difficulty in finding an invasion
of a right of privacy.' 6 ' He thought that the plaintiff's real complaint,
and "perhaps a justified one, '  was that plaintiff was not paid for the
telecasting of his show.
163
Similarly, in Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc. '6" ("Paulsen") a
well-known comedian had a comedy routine in which he proposed to run
for the presidency. 165 An unpublished photograph of the comedian was
marketed as a poster with the addition of the words "for President" at
the bottom, without the comedian's consent. 166 Plaintiff moved for a
preliminary injunction which was predicated on an invasion of his right
of privacy under Section 5 1.167 The court held that plaintiff was not enti-
tled to the injunction in view of the apparent privilege derived from the
public interest character of the picture.
168
However, the court noted that it was not plaintiff's privacy at all
that concerned him. The court stated that "[p]rivacy in its usual sense is
154. Id. at 880.
155. Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, 58 Misc. 2d at 7, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
156. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
157. 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).
158. Id. at 357, 107 N.E.2d at 487.
159. Id. at 356-57, 107 N.E.2d at 486-87.
160. Id. at 359, 107 N.E.2d at 488.
161. Id. at 361, 107 N.E.2d at 489.
162. Gautier 304 N.Y. at 361, 107 N.E.2d at 489.
163. Id.
164. 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1968).
165. Id at 445, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
166. Id
167. Id. at 447, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
168. Id. at 451, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 509. It should be noted, however, that "The Paulsen case
is unique to its facts and must be so considered." Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Urban Sys., 72
Misc. 2d at 790, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 146 (1973).
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hardly the goal of an entertainer or performer." 169 It further stated that
"[w]hat such a figure really seeks is a type of relief which will enable him
to garner financial benefits from the pecuniary value which attaches to
his name and picture."17 The court acknowledged this concept as the
"right of publicity," but found that the New York courts have not shown
an inclination to adopt such a construction for Section 51.171 Moreover,
the court stated that the clear purpose of the statute was to redress injury
for invasions of a "person's right to be let alone." '17 2
In addition, a right of privacy is asserted where the violation results
from an unauthorized publication involving substantial falsification or
placing the plaintiff in a "false light in the public eye." 173 However,
where such allegations are made against a media defendant by a public
figure, the courts have imposed a rigorous standard on the plaintiff to
protect the constitutional protections of freedom of the press and the
media. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 174 ("Time, Inc. "), a private family was in-
voluntarily thrust into the media when they were held hostage in their
home by escaped convicts. 175 The family filed suit in the New York
courts seeking damages under Sections 50 and 51 against Life Magazine
for its publication of photos taken from a play that sensationalized the
family's experience. 176 The plaintiffs argued that the article "mirrored
the Hill family's experience, which, to defendant's knowledge 'was false
and untrue.' ",177 The court held that "[c]onstitutional protections for
free expression preclude applying New York's statute to redress false re-
ports of newsworthy matters absent proof that the publisher knew of
their falsity or acted in total disregard of the truth."'
178
However, where the right of publicity does not involve a claim of
falsification, it is often stated that a public figure's right to privacy in-
169. Paulsen, 59 Misc. 2d at 450, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 450, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
172. Id.
173. See generally Lerman, 745 F.2d at 135 ("One who gives publicity to a matter concern-
ing another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of privacy .. "); Davis, 90 A.D.2d at 381, n.3, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 314, n.3.
See also Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 571-72; Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 374.
174. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 374.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 378.
177. Id.
178. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 375. See also Davis, 90 A.D.2d at 382, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 315
("The Civil Rights Law is construed 'so that the use will be considered for the purposes of
trade if it contains substantial falsification or is not really connected with the matter of public
interest, and provided that the defendant was aware of, or recklessly disregarded, this fact'
.... .).
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cludes an "independent right to have [his] personality, free from com-
mercial exploitation at the hands of another." '179 In Brinkley, fashion
model Christie Brinkley alleged a violation of her right of privacy under
Section 51 for the unauthorized sale of a poster without her consent. 180
Brinkley had agreed to participate in a poster project, reviewed and dis-
cussed the selection of a suitable print and engaged in final retouching of
the photograph."8 ' One of the defendants, however, proceeded to com-
mercially distribute the posters without obtaining the customary written
release authorizing distribution of the model's photograph or likeness. 2
The court noted at the outset that the sale of the poster was a use of
plaintiff's photograph for trade purposes. 1 3 The court found that plain-
tiff reserved the right, prior to their commercial exploitation, to reject or
approve the use to which the photographs would be put.'8 4 The court
also stated that "[p]laintiff's photograph or the manner in which it was
designed to be used [did not] involve a subject of general interest so as to
bring it within the public domain as a newsworthy matter."' 85
Currently, the New York courts hold that Section 51 encompasses
the right of publicity as an aspect of the right of privacy. 8 6 This right
recognizes the pecuniary value which attaches to the names and pictures
of public figures, particularly athletes and entertainers. 87 It is often
stated that the right of publicity protects the proprietary interest in the
profitability of the public reputation or "persona" of the public figure. 8 s
179. Brinkley, 80 A.D.2d at 433, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1008 (citing Booth v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 15 A.D.2d 343, 351, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, 745 (1962). See also Gautier, 304 N.Y. at 488, 107
N.E.2d at 359 ("While one who is a public figure or is presently may be the proper subject of
news or informative presentation, the privilege does not extend to commercialization of his
personality through a form of treatment distinct from the dissemination of news or
information.").
180. Brinkley, 80 A.D.2d at 429, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
181. Id. at 429, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1006.
182. Id. at 430, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1006.
183. Id. at 433, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1008.
184. Brinkley, 80 A.D.2d at 434, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
185. Id. at 433-34, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1008.
186. Id. at 439, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1012 ("so-called right of publicity is subsumed in Sections
50 and 51 .... "). See also Samuelson, Revising Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment De-
fenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. R. 836, 842 (1983) ("Another
reason for the confusion about the proper way to characterize publicity rights is that many of
the privacy cases involving commercial appropriations have been brought under New York's
'right of privacy statute,' which merges commercial appropriations of both privacy and public-
ity interests.").
187. Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 728 (citing Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 562 (1976)).
188. Id.
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C. Restrictive Treatment of Trade Purpose
The New York courts have wrestled with what constitutes use of a
person's name, portrait or picture as a trade purpose.18 9 If the name,
portrait or picture is used without consent to promote the sale of a collat-
eral product, under a strict interpretation of the statute, an advertising
purpose will result."9° However, in either case, whether or not a picture
is used for advertising or trade purposes, is a question of fact to be de-
cided at trial on the merits.191
One well-settled rule in this area, is that aprofit motive is not enough
to determine the existence of a trade purpose. 192 The rationale for this
rule is that "[a] contrary rule would unreasonably and unrealistically
limit the exception to a nonprofit or purely altruistic [organiza-
tion] . . ,193 It is also stated that the publication of a newspaper, maga-
zine, or book which imparts truthful news or other factual information to
the public does not fall within the purposes of trade provision under the
statute, even though the publication is published and sold for a profit. 194
However, if a photograph of a well-known celebrity is included in a
magazine "merely to attract attention," the court will find that the publi-
cation was for purposes of trade. 195 For example, in Ali v. Playgirl,
Inc. 196 ("Ali"), the former heavyweight champion sought relief under
Section 51 for the unauthorized publication of an objectionable portrait
of the former champion in a magazine. 97 The portrait at issue depicted
a nude black man seated in the corner of a boxing ring which unmistaka-
bly represented the plaintiff Ali.' 9 ' The court found that the phrase
"portrait or picture," as used in Section 51, is not restricted to photo-
graphs, but "generally comprises those representations which are recog-
nizable as likenesses of the complaining individual."'1 99 The court found
that the portrait was clearly included in the magazine solely "for pur-
poses of trade - e.g., merely to attract attention. ' 2°' The newsworthy
189. See generally Davis, 90 A.D.2d at 359, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 313; Grant, 367 F. Supp. at
879.
190. Paulsen, 59 Misc. 2d at 447, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 505 (1971).
191. Murray v. New York Magazine Co., 27 N.Y.2d 406, 408, 267 N.E.2d 256, 257 (1971).
192. Davis, 90 A.D.2d at 379, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 313 (citing Arrington, 55 N.Y.2d at 440, 434
N.E.2d at 1322).
193. Stephano, 64 N.Y.2d at 185, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
194. Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, 58 Misc. 2d 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 128-29.
195. Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 727; see also Grant, 367 F. Supp. at 881.
196. Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 725.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 726.
200. Id. at 727.
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exception also did not apply because there was no such informational or
newsworthy dimension to the unauthorized use.2 ° ' In response to the
defendant's contention that the right of privacy does not extend to an
athlete who chooses to bring himself to public notice, the court stated
"[t]hat [plaintiff] may have voluntarily on occasion surrendered [his] pri-
vacy, for a price or gratuitously, [but] does not forever forfeit for any-
one's commercial profit so much of [his] privacy as [he] has not
relinquished." 
202
D. Commercial Market for Right of Publicity
A definite commercial market exists for the exploitation of a public
figure's face.203 As stated in Grant, the court can take judicial notice
"[t]hat there is a fairly active market for the exploitation of faces, names
and reputations of celebrities .... , 20 One common means of exploiting
this market is the sale of T-shirts, sweatshirts and buttons.20 5 By simply
imposing a celebrity's picture onto such tangible goods, the value of the
good will increase.20 6
Sometimes the distributor of a commercial product will provide the
ingenuity to create new mediums that exploit this valuable market. For
example, in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc., 207 the de-
fendant marketed and distributed an "adult educational career game"
entitled "The Howard Hughes Game. ' 20 8 The court was asked to decide
whether such usage violated Sections 50 and 51 because the game re-
stated, in another form, the events of Hughes' career or whether it should
consider this form of distributive publication as an act of appropria-
tion.2°9 In other words, where do you draw the line between the right of
201. Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 727.
202. Id. (quoting Booth, 15 A.D.2d at 351-52, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 745).
203. See generally Brinkley, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004; Paulsen, 59 Misc. 2d 444,
299 N.Y.S.2d 501. See also Onassis, 122 Misc. 2d at 607, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 258 ("[T]he picture
of a well-known personality, used in an ad and instantly recognizable, will still serve as a badge
of approval for that commercial product.").
204. Grant, 367 F. Supp. at 881.
205. Cf Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Choppy Prods., Inc., 74 Misc. 2d 1003, 347 N.Y.S.2d 84
(1972).
206. Id. See also Onassis, 122 Misc. 2d at 604, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 257 ("The use of a well-
known designer name in marketing goods is to render the product distinctive and desirable, to
impart to the product a certain cachet, and to create in the public a mind-set or overall impres-
sion so that the designer names are readily associated and become synonymous with a certain
status and class of qualities.").
207. 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), modified on other grounds, 42
A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973).
208. Id. at 789, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
209. Id. See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971)
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the public "to know" and an act of appropriation.21 ° The court found
that defendant's use of this medium did not constitute the dissemination
of news nor were they educating the public.2" Instead, the court de-
scribed the game as "merely the medium used to market a commodity
familiar to us all in its varied types and forms."2 2
Posters are also recognized by celebrities as a profitable means to
exploit pictures of themselves on the commercial market. For example,
the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders2" 3 recognized this lucrative poster mar-
ket. In 1977, the cheerleaders posed for a poster for commercial distribu-
tion and copyrighted it.214 Thus, when a group of former Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders tried to mimick the poster in a topless state, the Dallas
Cowboy Cheerleaders filed suit. In Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders v.
Scoreboard Posters, Inc.,2" 5 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a preliminary in-
junction to prevent further distribution of the mimicking poster.216
Similarly, in Factors, two days after Elvis Presley's death, the de-
fendant purchased a copyright of a photograph of Elvis and used the
photo to publish a poster entitled "In Memory," bearing the dates "1935-
1977. '"2 '7 The defendant argued that the publication of the "memorial
poster" was a newsworthy event. The court, however, held that plaintiff
had acquired an exclusive right to exploit the Presley name and likeness
encompassed under Elvis' right of publicity which survived the celeb-
rity's death.2 18
State and federal constitutional concerns for the first amendment
protections of freedom of speech and press, make it difficult to draw the
line between the right of the public to know and an act of appropria-
tion.219 The "privilege of enlightening the public" 220 encompasses a very
vast and expansive range of subjects.2 21 However, the right of publicity
("Thus in New York... plaintiff has recovered when his name or picture, or other likeness,
has been used without his consent to advertise the defendant's product, or to accompany an
article sold, to add luster to the name of a corporation, or for other business purposes.").
210. Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d at 790, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Dallas, 600 F.2d at 1185-86 ("The Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders are a group of women
who perform as cheerleaders on the sidelines during games played by the Dallas Cowboys, a
football team.").
214. Id. at 1186.
215. 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979).
216. Id. at 1188-89.
217. Factors, 579 F.2d at 217.
218. Id. at 222.
219. Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d at 790, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
220. Paulsen, 59 Misc. 2d at 448, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
221. Id. ("The privilege of enlightening the public is by no means limited to dissemination
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also protects a proprietary interest and a market that does not involve the
dissemination of news, but the sale of commodities within a commercial
market.
V. ANALYSIS
The wrestling match between the Titan Wrestlers and Comics
World is about to begin. The Titan Wrestlers are bound and determined
to establish that the 16" x 22" photographs that are stapled into Comics
World's magazines are commercial posters. Further, that the photo-
graphs infringe upon Titan's right of publicity and thus constitute use for
purposes of trade under Section 51. Comics World is just as determined
to establish that the 16" x 22" photographs are newsworthy items and
thus protected under the first amendment. The outcome of this match
will determine whether Comics World's use of the 16" x 22" photo-
graphs constitute use for purposes of trade under the statute. The deci-
sive question is whether the public interest aspect of the 16" x 22"
photographs is merely incidental to Comics World's commercial
purpose.222
"ROUND ONE"
A. Magazine Cover Does Not Provide First Amendment Protection
Although Comics World's publications are bona fide newspaper
publications that are normally entitled to first amendment protections,
the Second Circuit correctly reasoned that the inquiry does not end here.
As stated by the Second Circuit, the first amendment does not protect "a
subterfuge or cover for private or commercial exploitation. ' 223 Thus, the
fact that the 16" x 22" photographs are folded and stapled within a typi-
cal magazine cover, does not provide Comics World's publications with
automatic first amendment protection.
In addition, items within a publication that are generally entitled to
first amendment protection may constitute use for purposes of trade, pre-
cluding protection under the first amendment.224 Therefore, as suggested
by the Second Circuit, the nature of the enclosed item must be
considered.225
of news in the sense of current events but extends far beyond to include all types of factual,
educational and historical data, or even entertainment and amusement, concerning interesting
phases of human activity in general.").
222. Titan, 870 F.2d at 89.
223. Id. at 88 (quoting Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 581).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 89.
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"ROUND Two"
B. Nature of the Item
In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc.,226 the court
held that the use of Howard Hughes' name, biographical data, etc., in
selling an adult educational career game was an act of appropriation of
property rights belonging to Howard Hughes. 22' The court found that
the use of Howard Hughes' name, biographical data, etc. in this context
was not legitimate to the public interest.228 The court described the
board game as "[m]erely the medium used to market a commodity famil-
iar to us all in its varied types and forms. "229
Posters are also a commodity that are familiar to us all. Quite ironi-
cally, the 1902 decision of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,
230
("Roberson"), to which the enactment of the statute is attributed, pro-
vides evidence of the use of the conventional poster as we know it. In
Roberson, a poster was used to advertise flour. Although the plaintiff
whose picture adorned the advertisement did not prevail in her suit for
invasion of her privacy, it is significant for our purposes that in 1902 the
general design of an oversized photograph was referred to as a "poster"
and recognized as a means of commercial advertisement.
More recently, this same concept fluorishes. For example, in Brink-
ley v. Casablancas,23 1 fashion model Christie Brinkley utilized a poster to
commercially exploit her marketable status. In Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc.,2 2 a "memorial poster" of Elvis Presley was involved and in
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc.,233 a poster
was utilized by the cheerleaders for publicity purposes. The "poster" in
all three modern instances involved an oversized photograph of approxi-
mately 16" x 22" used for commercial purposes as an item of display and
decoration.
Posters are simply another medium through which celebrities can
exploit their names and likenesses similar to other commodities sold in
the commercial market, like T-shirts and coffee cups. A market for pos-
ters is evident where sales occur for three quarter of a million copies at
226. 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144.
227. Id. at 790, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
228. Id., 340 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
229. Id.
230. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
231. 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
232. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978).
233. 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979).
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an average retail price of $2.50.234 As shown in Brinkley, a well-known
celebrity will take care in selecting the proper photo and quality of the
poster.235
Similarly, the Titan Wrestlers utilize posters as a medium to exploit
the value of their publicity as part of Titan's heavy merchandising cam-
paign. 236 Titan also sells and/or licenses the sale of action figures (dolls),
T-shirts and other clothing, trading cards, programs, lunch-boxes, and
other items.237 These items of merchandise are sold to provide income to
Titan Wrestlers and to increase public interest and awareness in the
World Wrestling Federation.238 In sum, a poster constitutes a commod-
ity sold as a commercial product in a commercial market.
"ROUND THREE"
B. Public Interest Incidental to Commercial Purpose
As stipulated by the parties, the Titan Wrestlers are public
figures.2 39 Undoubtedly, "[t]he very nature and character of such status,
evokes public interest in [their] doings and [their] activities are generally
speaking always 'news.' "24 Consequently, any photograph, whether
posed or live-action, taken of the Titan Wrestlers would fall under the
newsworthy exception of the statute. Therefore, to assess whether the
public interest is merely incidental to the commercial purpose of the un-
authorized use of the wrestler's photographs, the court should not con-
sider whether the photographs are taken from a public performance.
In Brinkley, the court rejected defendant's argument that since the
picture of the fashion model was taken during a public performance with
consent, it was removed from the sphere of any right of privacy. 241 The
court conceded that although the photograph was used during a public
performance with the consent of the model, the particular photograph in
question originated from an earlier photo session.242 Thus, a narrow
holding of Brinkley is that if the photograph is taken as part and parcel
of an original performance, any commercial use of the photograph would
not violate the statute.
234. Dallas, 600 F.2d at 1186.
235. Brinkley, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004.
236. Brief for Appellant at 9, Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World, 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.
1989) (No. 88-7734).
237. Id
238. Id.
239. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1317.
240. Paulsen, 59 Misc. 2d at 449, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
241. Brinkley, 80 A.D.2d at 433, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
242. Id.
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However, the purpose of the statute is to prohibit commercial mis-
appropriation of a person's name or picture.243 Thus any blanket author-
ization to commercially distribute a photograph of a public figure merely
because it was taken from an original public performance, would obviate
this purpose. 24
In addition, the Brinkley court held that a photograph that is
designed for use as a poster does not involve a subject of general interest
so as to bring it within the public domain as a newsworthy matter.245
The Second Circuit also found that "[i]n contrast to the treatment of
newsworthy items, it seems clear that photographs marketed as posters
are used for purposes of trade. ' ' 2 ' Therefore, although photographs of
the Titan Wrestlers, whether posed or live-action, are matters of public
interest, the commercial purpose of the 16" x 22" photographs prevents
the newsworthy exception from applying in this case. Instead, the cor-
rect focus is on the commercial aspect of the product at issue, its com-
mon design and treatment in the commercial market.
The district court also erroneously distinguished the poster in Brink-
ley and Factors as posters "of the type suitable for framing, and printed
on high quality, heavy bond paper. '247  In Brinkley, fashion model
Christie Brinkley reviewed color transparencies and was involved in the
selection of the most suitable print for a poster.24' The court found that
plaintiff reserved a right to reject or approve the use of the photographs
prior to any commercial exploitation.249 Thus, under a right of publicity,
the quality of a poster depends upon the discretion and control of the
celebrity. By considering the quality of a 16" x 22" photograph folded
and stapled into a magazine, the court ignores the commercial nature of
this product.
For example, a T-shirt is commercially sold and distributed as wear-
ing apparel. As stated by the appellate court in Titan, 250 a T-shirt bear-
ing the likeness of a Titan Wrestler illustrates the type of commodity
which could not be stapled into Comics World's magazine.25 Similarly,
243. Davis, 90 A.D.2d at 381, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
244. See Bi-Rite Enterprises v. Bruce Miner Co., Inc., 757 F.2d 440, 445 (lst Cir. 1985)
(Defendant's claim that performers who agree to pose at unrestricted photo sessions do so with
the understanding that the photographers may use the resultant photographs however they
choose was too broad.).
245. Brinkley, 80 A.D.2d at 433-34, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
246. Titan, 870 F.2d at 88.
247. Titan, 690 F. Supp. at 1322.
248. 80 A.D.2d at 430, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.
249. Id. at 434, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
250. 870 F.2d at 85.
251. Id. at 88.
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the poster has a commercial purpose as a commodity sold for display or
decoration. The quality of the 16" x 22" photographs is therefore irrele-
vant to the commercial purpose of this product.
Moreover, the language on the cover of Comics World's magazines
"10 FULL COLOR WRESTLING POSTERS! HUGE SIZE!" '2 52 or
"Wrestling All-Stars Poster Magazine" 253 admits that the folded and sta-
pled 16" x 22" photographs are commercial posters. Comics World's use
of the term "poster" is an obvious referral to what constitutes a tradi-
tional, commercial poster, regardless of the quality.
In addition, once removed and unfolded, there is nothing to prevent
a wrestling fan to frame and display the 16" x 22" photograph in the
same manner as the traditional poster sold in the retail market. Again,
by Comics World's own admission, they acknowledge that "EXCITING
WRESTLING ACTION [IS] READY FOR YOUR WALLS!" ' 254 Obvi-
ously, Comics World does not feel the quality inhibits the use of the pho-
tographs as a commercial poster.
In a practical sense, it is the lesser quality that enables Comics
World to fold and manipulate the photographs into neat 8" x 11"
squares. Comics World frankly admits that they "have discontinued re-
ferring to these folded out pages as 'posters,' and now call them 'pin-
ups.' "255 However, a different choice of reference, like the quality of
paper, should not confuse an obvious attempt to participate in a commer-
cial market.
Therefore, the commercial purpose is not inherent in the quality of
Comics World's product, but in the nature and form of treatment that is
identical to the traditional commercial poster sold on the commercial
market. Thus, in the balance between the public interest and a commer-
cial purpose of Comics World's product, the primary value of Comics
World's product is commercial.
"ROUND FOUR"
C. Newsworthy Exception Does Not Apply
1. No Real Relationship
As stated above, a photograph accompanying an article concerning
252. Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
253. Id. (emphasis added).
254. Brief for Appellant at 15, Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World, 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.
1989) (No. 88-7734) (emphasis added).
255. Brief for Appellees at 9, Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World, 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.
1989) (No. 88-7734).
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a matter of public interest may still be considered a use for the purposes
of trade if "it has no real relationship to the article ... or... the article is
an advertisement in disguise." '256 For example, in Arrington, a photo-
graph of a man walking down the street was "prominently displayed"
across the cover of a publication, without his knowledge, for an article
regarding the black middle class.257 The court held that the subject of
the article was of public interest, and further, that the plaintiff could be
perceived to be a member of the black middle class.258 Therefore, plain-
tiff's assertions that no real relationship existed based on his inconsonant
views with the author of the article was denied.
In Titan, up to ten posters are stapled into the center of each publi-
cation and cannot be viewed in their entirety, unless unstapled and re-
moved.259  Unlike in Arrington, the folded photographs are not
"prominently displayed" in a manner to enable the reader to perceive
any association between the depicted wrestlers and any corresponding
news article. Thus, any real relationship between the photo and the arti-
cle is physically impossible.
In one of defendants' publications containing 10 posters, one page
appears that contains text and photographs about each featured wrestler,
but makes no reference to the posters nor does the page have any proxim-
ity to the poster. 2" In this particular publication, unlike the publication
in Arrington, the photographs do not exhibit, represent, or explain an
accompanying article of public interest. Therefore, even if this one page
of text constitutes a matter of public interest, there is no real relationship
whatsoever between the one page of text and the posters.
2. First Amendment Does Not Protect Sale of Commodities
In Titan, the commercial purpose inherent in Comics World's prod-
uct prevents application of the first amendment in this case. As one com-
mentator notes, "[iln several cases in the past five years, defendants have
brandished the first amendment as a shield against liability for interfer-
ence with the plaintiff's publicity rights."26'
The privilege of disseminating news and information to the public is
not without its limits. As stated in Gautier, "[w]hile one who is a public
256. Titan, 870 F.2d at 88.
257. Arrington, 55 N.Y.2d at 433, 434 N.E.2d at 1320.
258. Id. at 440-41, 434 N.E.2d at 1322.
259. Titan, 870 F.2d at 86.
260. Brief for Appellant at 14, Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World, 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.
1989) (No. 88-7734).
261. See Samuelson, Revising Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses In Right of
Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1983).
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figure or is presently newsworthy may be the proper subject of news or
informative presentation, the privilege does not extend to commercializa-
tion of his personality through a form of treatment distinct from the dis-
semination of news and information." '2 6 2 In Titan, "A poster presents a
somewhat closer case because news photos as such are entitled to the full
protection of the first amendment." 263 However, the commercial nature
and purpose will distinguish Comics World's product from the dissemi-
nation of news and information. As stated by the Second Circuit, "[i]n
contrast to the treatment of newsworthy items, it seems clear that photo-
graphs marketed as posters are used for purposes of trade.
' 2 6
1
In addition, under first amendment analysis, the critical question is
"[whether] ... the mere threat of litigation - would tend to inhibit this
defendant - or any other publisher who might learn of the decision -
in the untrammeled exercise of any right guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment?" 265 In Titan, "poster magazines" are novel publications. It is also
"common knowledge that the models for the centerfolds in magazines
such as Playboy, High Society, Penthouse and Playgirl not only consent
to but are extremely well paid for the use of their photographs.
26 6
Therefore, a decision which grants relief to the Titan Wrestlers will not
affect a publisher's editorial initiative to either engage in poster publica-
tions or to do so without providing compensation to the appropriate
party.
Moreover, a favorable decision for the Titan Wrestlers will inform
other prospective media defendants that a commercial nature and pur-
pose will distinguish a product sold in the commercial market from the
dissemination of news and information. In addition, if a prospective me-
dia defendant desires to appropriate the name or likeness of a celebrity to
sell a commercial product, they will do so with knowledge that consent
must first be obtained.
Finally, the media's immunity from false or fictional reports unless
published with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of the
truth, does not apply in this case. 2 67 For example, in Time, Inc., the
262. Gautier, 107 N.E.2d at 488, 304 N.Y. at 359. Accord Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 727.
263. Titan, 870 F.2d at 88.
264. Id.
265. Grant, 367 F.Supp. at 882.
266. Reply Brief of Appellant at 6, Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World, 870 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1989) (No. 88-7734).
267. See Lerman, 745 F.2d at 135 ("One who gives publicity to a matter concerning an-
other that places the other before the public in a false light ...."). See also Time, Inc., 385
U.S. at 387-88 ("We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the
application of the New York Statute [Sections 50 and 51] to redress false reports of matters of
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plaintiff's alleged damages under Sections 50 and 51 on "allegations that
the Life article was intended to, and did, give the impression that the
play mirrored the Hill Family's experience, which, to the knowledge of
defendant '. . . was false and untrue.'"268 Also, in Lerman, where a
magazine misidentified plaintiff as an actress that appeared topless and in
an "orgy" scene, the court found the degree of falsity was severe.2 69
However, in false light claims, the first amendment protects against the
"risk of [saddling] the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a
certainty the facts associated in news articles with a person's name, pic-
ture or portrait .... In Titan, we are not confronted with any al-
leged misrepresentation of facts associated in any corresponding news
articles or anything but clear representations of the Titan Wrestlers.
Thus, any attendant risks of burdening the press with verifying certainty
of facts or any representation of the Titan Wrestlers is non-existent in
this case.
The Titan Wrestlers also do not seek to suppress any truthful ac-
counts of their lives from the public. In these cases, it is clear that Sec-
tions 50 and 51 does not give a public figure the right to suppress truthful
accounts of their lives.27' It is also clear that the oversized photographs
in Titan, are not involved in projecting the Titan Wrestlers into any
political scene which under Paulsen, caused the posters to fall under the
newsworthy exception.
VI. CONSEQUENCES
The law under Sections 50 and 51 is still in the process of develop-
ment. As stated in Brinkley, "[tihe state of law in the right of privacy
area 'is till that of a haystack in a hurricane.... "272 Titan allows the
New York courts to establish that the commercial nature and purpose
will distinguish a product from the dissemination of news and informa-
tion under a right of publicity pursuant to Sections 50 and 51.
A decision in favor of Comics' World will provide media defendants
public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge
of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.").
268. Id. at 378.
269. Lerman, 745 F.2d at 133. Also citing Time, Inc. and Zacchini for the proposition that
"it is essential to analyze 'trade purposes' claims under Section 51 to determine whether First
Amendment concerns surrounding this false light tort are implicated. If not, the press is enti-
tled only to the limited First Amendment protection afforded under ZacchinC' Id. at 135.
270. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 389.
271. See Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d at 4, 294 N.Y.S.2d at
127 (1968).
272. Brinkley, 80 A.D.2d at 436, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
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with a very large loophole to undermine the statute under the auspices of
disseminating news and information. A media defendant with the inge-
nuity to alter or manipulate the form of a commercial product, especially
paper products, will enjoy immunity under the statute. Unless the com-
modity involved is a T-shirt, sweatshirt, button or like product that is
difficult to alter, the right of publicity will be seriously undermined.
Consequently, any established proprietary interest in a celebrity's like-
ness and reputation will receive minimal protection similar to that af-
forded by the right of privacy.
Further, a decision adverse to the Titan Wrestlers will result in
many other magazines including large photographs into their publica-
tions. Under the cloak of a newsworthy event, oversized photographs
taken from original, public performances will surface as common fea-
tures in magazines.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Titan Wrestlers are definitely in the business of providing a
unique form of entertainment. Their creative efforts have not only cat-
apulted the sport of professional wrestling into national popularity, but
the wrestlers have also garnered themselves a special place in the en-
tertainment industry. Their ability to reap the rewards from their mar-
ketable status should be protected under the right of publicity subsumed
within Sections 50 and 51 of New York Civil Rights Law.
In Titan, it is clear that the commercial nature of the 16" x 22"
photographs precludes any real relationship to any corresponding news
article, and thus constitute use for purposes of trade under the statute.
In addition, even though the Titan Wrestlers are newsworthy subjects,
the public interest involved is merely incidental to the commercial pur-
pose of Comics World's product. Hence, Comics World cannot use the
first amendment as a shield against liability in this case.
The dissemination of news and information occurs within the mar-
ketplace of ideas, while the sale and promotion of commercial products
takes place within a commercial market. While true that constitutional
protections do not end at 8" x 11", such protections must end where the
media attempts to market a commercial item as a newsworthy idea.
Doreen Marie Mercado
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